The Fractured Colossus: An Evaluation of Gender-Based Asylum Claims for the 2020s by Goronja, Karlo
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 
Volume 27 Issue 1 Article 9 
Fall 2020 
The Fractured Colossus: An Evaluation of Gender-Based Asylum 
Claims for the 2020s 
Karlo Goronja 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, goronja.k21@law.wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law 
Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karlo Goronja, The Fractured Colossus: An Evaluation of Gender-Based Asylum Claims for the 2020s, 27 
Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 317 (). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol27/iss1/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
317 
The Fractured Colossus:  An Evaluation 
of Gender-Based Asylum Claims for the 
2020s 
Karlo Goronja* 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ................................................................................ 318 
A. Roadmap for the Future ....................................................... 320 
B. Historical Application ........................................................... 320 
C. Modern Application ............................................................... 325 
 
II. The 1951 Convention and the Current State of Immigration 
Jurisprudence in the United States ............................................. 327 
A. Matter of A-B- and Its Implications on Asylum Law in the 
United States .............................................................................. 329 
B. Progress in the Wake of Matter of A-B- ............................... 333 
 
III. Fitting Gender-Based Asylum Claims in the Current 
Framework ..................................................................................... 335 
A. Immutable Characteristic..................................................... 335 
B. Social Distinction .................................................................. 337 
C. Particularity........................................................................... 339 
 
IV. Resistance to Broad Gender-Based Claims .......................... 343 
 
V. Proposal ..................................................................................... 347 
A. Judicial Resolution ................................................................ 348 
B. Statutory Amendment/Regulation ....................................... 349 
C. Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law .................... 350 
D. General Immigration Proposals ........................................... 351 
 
 * Candidate for J.D. May 2021, Washington & Lee University School of 
Law. I would like to thank my parents and friends simply for existing, and all of 
my fellow refugees and migrants across the world who inspired this Note. I would 
also like to thank my faculty advisor, David C. Baluarte, for his wisdom, guidance, 
and enthusiasm for this project even when I had my doubts. 
318 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 317 (2020) 
1. Standard of Review ............................................................ 352 
2. Legal Representation ......................................................... 355 
3. Status of the Immigration Courts ..................................... 356 
 
VI. Conclusion................................................................................ 357 
I. Introduction 
Tatyana Vladimirova Basova, a native and citizen of Russia, 
arrived in the United States in 1994.1 While in her home country, 
Ms. Basova was a victim of repeated abduction and rape by the 
Chechen Mafia for a period of more than two-and-a-half years.2 
She even became pregnant from the rapes and faced the decision 
of aborting the pregnancy.3 Each time her attackers allowed her to 
go home, they threatened her and told her to remain silent about 
the rapes and abductions.4 Her parents attempted to receive help 
from local authorities who refused to intervene, expressing concern 
about a potential conflict with the Mafia, given its strength and 
political influence.5 Upon Basova’s departure from Russia, the 
Mafia burned down her parents’ cottage and threatened to kill her 
if she ever returned.6 
Basova sought asylum in the United States and was denied by 
the immigration court, by the Board of Immigration Appeals, and 
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals because—although she was 
found to have been persecuted—her persecution did not fall into 
the statutory categories of race, religion, political opinion, 
nationality, or membership in a particular social group.7 Basova 
was ordered removed from the United States.8 The rest of her story 
is unknown.  
 
 1.  See Basova v. I.N.S., No. 98-9540, 1999 WL 495640, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining Basova’s background and experiences). 
 2.  Id. (describing Basova’s path to her asylum application). 
 3.  Id. at *3 (explaining the extent of her persecution).  
 4.  Id. (describing the threats Basova received). 
 5.  Id. (stating that the Chechen mafia was essentially a 
quasi-governmental entity).  
 6.  Id. (explaining that the persecution continued even after she left Russia). 
 7.  See id. (“[W]e cannot rewrite the law or force the INS to permit asylum 
under these circumstances.”). 
 8.  See id. (“Because Ms. Basova cannot establish her entitlement to asylum, 
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Basova’s experience with American immigration law is not 
particularly unique.9 This is because the prevailing interpretation 
of asylum law in the United States does not allow for asylum 
claims on the basis of gender.10 Currently, an individual seeking 
asylum must establish that they meet the definition of “refugee” in 
that race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in 
a particular social group was one central reason for their 
persecution.11 Because gender is absent from the categories listed, 
applicants like Basova must try to fit their asylum claim into one 
of the enumerated grounds, and are regularly met with denial.12  
Victims of gender-based persecution most commonly try to 
mold their asylum claims to fit under the fifth category, 
“membership in a particular social group.”13 This category is 
notably vague, rendering it a potential “catch-all” for claims that 
do not fall within the other categories.14 Claims based on gender 
have not been particularly successful, and in 2018, former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued an opinion in Matter of 
A-B-15 attempting to foreclose the opportunity for successful 
 
she cannot satisfy the more stringent standard required for withholding of 
removal.”). 
 9.  See, e.g., R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 2001) (denying asylum to 
a Guatemalan woman who was raped, sodomized, and brutally beaten by her 
husband).  
 10.  See Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Possession of 
broadly-based characteristics such as youth or gender will not by itself endow 
individuals with membership in a particular group.”). 
 11.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (articulating that for an applicant 
to establish being a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), the applicant must 
establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecution). 
 12.  See Valerie Plant, Honor Killings and the Asylum Gender Gap, 15 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 118 (2005) (“Many cases necessarily framed in 
gender-related terms have met with failure.”).  
 13.  See Danette Gomez, Last in Line – The United States Trails Behind in 
Recognizing Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 959, 965 (2003) 
(explaining the best chance of success for victims of gender-based persecution). 
 14.  See Plant, supra note 12, at 118 (“A ‘Particular Social Group,’ as a 
category, was never defined in the United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees or in the Refugee Act of 1980, which has allowed it to be a 
malleable catch-all . . . .”).  
 15.   A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (AG 2018) (holding that victims of private 
violence will not be eligible for asylum and countries’ problems policing certain 
crimes does not establish asylum eligibility). 
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asylum applications from victims of domestic violence, 
complicating gender-based claims further.16 
A. Roadmap for the Future 
This Note analyzes asylum law’s lack of explicit protection for 
individuals who suffer persecution based on their gender, and the 
reluctance of immigration courts to grant asylum for claims 
centered on the applicant’s gender. This Note explores 
opportunities for relief from removal for gender-based asylum 
claims under the current framework, namely under the particular 
social group category of United States immigration law. After 
analysis under current law, this Note proposes a judicial resolution 
explicitly recognizing particular social groups such as “women 
from [country].” Next, a statutory of regulatory amendment is 
suggested that unequivocally allows for asylum claims on the basis 
of gender or sex. Additionally, prosecutorial discretion is analyzed 
as an avenue of quick and efficient change to immigration 
enforcement. Next, this Note proposes a series of general 
immigration law changes that would indirectly address 
gender-based asylum. This Note suggests that a “hard look” 
standard of review be adopted for immigration cases in appellate 
courts, departing from the current, highly deferential “substantial 
evidence” and Chevron17 reviews. Finally, this Note proposes a 
public defender program for immigration courts, as well as 
removing such courts from the influence of the Department of 
Justice. 
B. Historical Application 
In 1985, the Board of Immigration Appeals (The Board) issued 
a decision defining “particular social group” to aid in analyzing 
asylum claims.18 The Board determined that a particular social 
 
 16.  See id. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic 
violence . . . will not qualify for asylum.”). 
 17.  See Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[A] 
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”).  
 18.  See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (outlining a guideline 
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group is a group of persons who share a common, immutable 
characteristic such as sex, color, kinship ties, or even certain 
shared past experiences.19 Although this created a very basic and 
inclusive framework, the general vagueness that remained still left 
inconsistency in the analysis of applicants who claimed 
membership in a particular social group.20 
For example, in Fatin v. I.N.S.,21 the Third Circuit denied 
asylum to an Iranian woman because she did not have a 
well-founded fear of persecution.22 Despite this, the Court was 
open to the applicant’s suggestion that women in Iran could be a 
particular social group.23 Conversely, the same court denied the 
claim of an Armenian woman who was kidnapped and trafficked, 
stating that a characteristic like gender is too broad to constitute 
a claim.24 This highlights the uncertainty and inconsistency that 
exists even within a single circuit.25 
The ambiguity in particular social group analysis has harmed 
many asylum-seekers, perhaps none more than women who have 
suffered persecution, with denials ranging from debatable to 
especially egregious, as shown in In re R-A-.26 In that case, Rodi 
 
definition for particular social group analysis). 
 19.  See id. at 233 (explaining what constitutes a particular social group).  
 20.  See Plant, supra note 12, at 119 (“That room for judicial interpretation 
has led to widely varying application and results.”). 
 21.  See Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
petitioner, an Iranian woman, was not entitled to withholding of deportation or 
asylum). 
 22.  See id. at 1243 (“In sum, whether her argument is couched in terms of 
membership in a ‘particular social group’ or in terms of ‘political opinion,’ the 
administrative record is insufficient to show that she has a well-founded fear of 
persecution.”). 
 23.  See id. at 1240 (“In the excerpt from Acosta quoted above, the Board 
specifically mentioned ‘sex’ as an innate characteristic that could link the 
members of a ‘particular social group.’”).  
 24.  See Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 322 F. App’x 136, 143 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“But, as we have noted, ‘[p]ossession of broadly-based characteristics such as 
youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a 
particular social group.’” (citing Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 
2003))).  
 25.  Compare Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240 (stating that sex could link members of 
a particular social group), with Sarkisian, 322 F. App’x at 143 (stating that gender 
is too broad to constitute a particular social group). 
 26.  See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 927 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding that a 
Guatemalan woman’s severe abuse was not on account of membership in a 
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Alvarado, a Guatemalan woman who married at age sixteen, 
experienced incomprehensible abuse for years at the hands of her 
husband.27 He regularly beat her both at home and in public, 
dislocated her jawbone when her menstrual period was late, 
violently kicked her in the spine when she did not want to abort 
the child, kicked her genitalia causing her to bleed severely for 
eight days, whipped her with electrical cords, pistol-whipped her, 
threw a machete at her, and on several occasions beat her to 
unconsciousness.28 He repeatedly raped and sodomized her, beat 
her before, after, and during the unwanted sex, and gave her a 
sexually transmitted disease.29 He abused her psychologically as 
well by telling her stories about killing babies and the elderly 
during his time in the army, he threatened to deface her and cut 
off her limbs, and he threatened to hunt her down and kill her if 
she left.30 He told her his reason for the abuse was because, “You’re 
my woman, you do what I say,” and, “I can do it if I want to.”31 After 
she attempted suicide on one occasion, he responded, “If you want 
to die, go ahead. But from here, you are not going to leave.”32 She 
sought help from the police and even appeared in front of a judge, 
who brushed off the abuse as a domestic issue.33 
Alvarado managed to escape to the United States and apply 
for asylum, only to be denied relief from removal.34 The Board of 
Immigration Appeals recognized that she suffered harm more than 
sufficient to constitute persecution, that her testimony was 
credible, and that she was unable to avail herself of the protection 
of the Guatemalan government.35 However, the Board denied her 
application on the basis that her proposed social group was not an 
actual social group.36 Namely, “Guatemalan women who have been 
 
particular social group, and therefore she was ineligible for asylum).  
 27.  See id. at 908–09 (detailing the abuse the asylum applicant suffered).  
 28. Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 909.  
 33.  See id. (“When the respondent appeared before a judge, he told her that 
he would not interfere in domestic disputes.”).  
 34.  See id. at 928 (granting the respondent voluntary departure).  
 35.  See id. at 914 (stating that the respondent meets all of the criteria). 
 36.  See id. at 917 (“[W]e find that the respondent’s claimed social group fails 
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involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who 
believe that women are to live under male domination” was too 
abstract to be formally recognized.37 The Board reasoned that it is 
unclear whether the proposed group is recognized and understood 
to be a societal faction, or whether the abuse suffered was due to 
membership in the group.38 In 2009, after a fourteen-year legal 
battle, Alvarado was eventually granted asylum, although no 
published opinion was issued.39 
Cases like Basova’s and Alvarado’s represent the significant 
flaw present in immigration jurisprudence in the United States. 
There is a general reluctance and refusal among courts to 
recognize valid claims based on gender because of the confusing 
framework that currently exists.40 Courts regularly leave 
individuals who have exhausted their available remedies to return 
to the danger from which they fled.41 In 1995, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service issued a memorandum to assist asylum 
officers in making preliminary decisions regarding gender-based 
claims, stating that such claims fall within the asylum framework, 
but courts continued analyzing particular social groups more 
 
under our own independent assessment of what constitutes a qualifying social 
group.”). 
 37.  See id. at 914, 917 (“The determinative issue . . . is whether the harm 
experience by the respondent was, or in the future may be, inflicted ‘on account 
of’ a statutorily protected ground.”). 
 38.  See id. at 918 (“The respondent has shown neither that the victims of 
spouse abuse view themselves as members of this group, nor, most importantly, 
that their male oppressors see their victimized companions as part of this 
group.”).  
 39.  See Matter of R-A-, U. CAL. HASTINGS, https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-
work/matter-r-a- (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (providing a timeline of Alvarado’s 
legal proceedings) [perma.cc/L2JY-76DX].  
 40.  See Bethany Lobo, Women as a Particular Social Group:  A Comparative 
Assessment of Gender Asylum Claims in the United States and United Kingdom, 
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 361, 363 (2012) (“[T]he United States fails to honor asylum’s 
political conception, i.e, to protect this subset of refugees who need surrogate 
international protection.”). 
 41.  Cf. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger:  
Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. 
U. L. REV. 337, 368 (2009) (“However, the Board rejected the asylum claim on 
grounds that are likely to continue to plague domestic violence-based asylum 
claims until there is a significant change in how gender-based claims are viewed 
overall.”). 
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narrowly and exclusively.42 In 2000, the Department of Justice 
issued a proposed regulation aimed at helping analyze cases based 
on violence by non-state actors.43 The Department of Justice stated 
that in some cases, domestic abusers are motivated by the victims’ 
gender or status in a domestic relationship, but ultimately did not 
go so far as to guarantee protection in these cases.44 The language 
that made it to the regulation was much weaker, only outlining 
gender, among other things, as something to be considered that 
“may or may not be relevant.”45 
Even in cases where the courts came to a favorable result, they 
avoided concluding that a broad category based on gender alone 
could constitute a particular social group.46 For example, in In re 
Kasinga,47 the Board of Immigration Appeals recognized that 
female genital mutilation was widespread in Togo and that the 
Togolese government took no action against it.48 Rather than 
 
 42.  See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection at 2, HCR/GIP/02/01 
(May 7, 2002) (“Adopting a gender-sensitive interpretation of the 1951 
Convention does not mean that all women are automatically entitled to refugee 
status.”); see also Melanie Randall, Particularized Social Groups and Categorical 
Imperatives in Refugee Law:  State Failures to Recognize Gender and the Legal 
Reception of Gender Persecution Claims in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 529, 553 (2014) (“[T]he same 
troubling classification phenomenon pertains in the U.S. case law with regard to 
‘particular social groups,’ which have been continuously defined in narrow and 
individualized terms.”).  
 43.  Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588-01 (proposed 
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).  
 44.  See id. at 76593 (“Thus, it may be possible in some cases for a victim of 
domestic violence to satisfy the ‘on account of’ requirement . . . .”); see also Silenzi 
Cianciarulo & David, supra note 41, at 371 (“Although it is useful that the 
Department rejected the Board’s strict approach, the proposed regulations fall 
short of guaranteeing refugee protection for battered women.”). 
 45.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3) (2019) (“[A]djudicators should 
consider . . . age, gender, health, social and family ties. These factors may or may 
not be relevant . . . and are not necessarily determinative . . . .”).  
 46.  See Randall, supra note 42, at 555 (“The definition of ‘particular social 
group’ in Kasinga, while representing a positive legal development in the U.S. 
context, is nevertheless one that shies away from grappling with gender as a 
category in its own right.”). 
 47.  See Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 368 (B.I.A. 1996) (granting asylum to a 
member of a Togolese tribe who has not had female genital mutilation performed 
on her).  
 48.  See id. at 362 (citing U.S. State Department reports on the practice of 
female genital mutilation in Togo). 
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accept a particular social group that consisted simply of Togolese 
women, the Board layered qualification upon qualification to 
determine that the relevant group was “young women of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by 
that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”49 The case is recognized 
as a step in the right direction, but the Board evaded the heart of 
the problem and refused to acknowledge that the practice of female 
genital mutilation is the plainest version of gender persecution.50 
C. Modern Application 
Throughout the years, the Board of Immigration Appeals has 
attempted to delineate the requirements for particular social 
groups.51 This was largely a result of challenges to the inconsistent 
application of the particular social group category.52 For example, 
the Third Circuit stated that the Board would not be entitled to 
Chevron deference for “erratic, irreconcilable interpretations of 
their governing statutes.”53 As a response, in 2014, the Board 
expounded on a “social distinction” requirement, stating that while 
a group does not need ocular visibility, it must be perceived as a 
group by society generally.54 Further, the Board noted that groups 
must be sufficiently particular, explaining that groups must not be 
amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.55 It reiterated that 
 
 49.  See id. at 365 (stating that the particular social group in question meets 
all standards).  
 50.  See Randall, supra note 42, at 555 (“The BIA failed to acknowledge that 
the persecution existed precisely ‘on account of’ her gender.”). 
 51.  See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014) (implementing social 
distinction requirements); see also W-G-R-, 26 I&N 208, 222 (B.I.A. 2014) 
(cautioning against overbroad social groups).  
 52.  See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“Although we afforded the BIA’s interpretation of “particular social group” 
Chevron deference in Fatin, this did not give the agency license to thereafter 
adjudicate claims of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally.”).  
 53.  See id. (explaining that agencies are not free to generate reckless 
interpretations of the statutes they are charged with enforcing). 
 54.  See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240 (“Society can consider persons to 
comprise a group without being able to identify the group’s members on sight.”).  
 55.  See id. at 239 (“The particularity requirement clarifies he point, at least 
implicit in earlier case law, that not every ‘immutable characteristic’ is 
sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.”).  
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“immutable characteristics” includes characteristics the individual 
cannot change or should not be required to change because they 
are fundamental to their identities.56 The Board also stated that 
“particularity” should be viewed with the specificity that race, 
religion, and nationality are viewed, and that the group “must be 
defined by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for 
determining who falls within the group.”57 
Despite the attempts at clarification, courts largely remain 
confused about how to perform particular social group analyses.58 
For example, within the Arlington Immigration Court alone, the 
asylum grant rate between judges varies from nine percent to 
eighty-five percent.59 Nationally, the rate varies from zero percent 
by Immigration Judge Farrar-Crockett in Atlanta, to ninety-seven 
percent by Immigration Judge Bukszpan in New York City.60 
Many courts have complained that the “particular social group” 
category is difficult to navigate, referring to it as “an enigmatic and 
difficult-to-define term.”61 Scholars suggest that the confusion 
stems from the Board of Immigration Appeal’s inconsistent 
explanations, like requiring defined boundaries on one hand but 
 
 56.  See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (“The critical requirement is that the 
defining characteristic of the group must be something that either cannot be 
changed or that the group members should not be required to change to avoid 
persecution.”).  
 57.  See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (“[T]he particularity requirement 
flows quite naturally from the language of the statute, which, of course, 
specifically refers to membership in a ‘particular social group.’”).  
 58.  See Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional:  Constricting the 
Particular Social Group Ground for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 487, 490–91 (2019) 
(“Despite the BIA’s efforts to clarify the meanings of social distinction and 
particularity, they remain confusing even for attorneys and are almost impossible 
for unrepresented asylum seekers to understand.”). 
 59.  See Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 
2014-2019, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS CLEARINGHOUSE (2019), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2019/denialrates.html (last visited 
Sep. 6, 2020) (charting asylum grant rates for every immigration judge nationally) 
[perma.cc/8D85-CLU5]. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Over time, the 
flexible nature of the common, immutable characteristic test created ‘confusion 
and a lack of consistency’ among the judges tasked with adjudicating asylum and 
withholding claims.”); see also Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 
2009) (“Although the other four protected grounds are denoted with a fair degree 
of clarity . . . the term ‘particular social group’ is ambiguous.”).  
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rejecting well-defined groups because they are large on the other 
hand.62 The Board’s guidelines were criticized for their failure to 
recognize persecution based solely on gender, particularly in 
societies where women are persecuted widely.63 Although there 
have been cases that recognized the possibility of a particular 
social group based simply on gender alone, they have failed to 
accrue any significant following that could change the landscape of 
asylum law in the United States.64 
II. The 1951 Convention and the Current State of Immigration 
Jurisprudence in the United States 
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (to which the U.S. is a party), declared that 
human beings should have unassailable rights and set forth 
standards for the treatment of refugees.65 The Convention was 
drafted in response to the atrocities committed during World War 
II, with its concern stemming from the persecution suffered by 
Jews and others on the grounds of race, religion, or politics.66 
Notably, the Convention is gender-neutral and neglects to 
 
 62.  See Marouf, supra note 58, at 491 (“Similarly, the BIA held that social 
distinction is based on the view of society as a whole, but in maintaining that 
previously recognized PSGs satisfied this standard, it relief on the perspectives 
of the persecutors.”).  
 63.  See Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender:  A Need for Refugee 
Law Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 221, 237–38 (2000) (“[T]he particular 
social group theory is flawed because it requires the female claimant to 
distinguish her persecution as greater than that of the average woman.”). 
 64.  See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (disagreeing 
with a BIA decision that stated that “all women in Guatemala” could not 
constitute a particular social group).  
 65.  See Ivor C. Jackson, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees:  A Universal Basis for Protection, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 403, 403 (1991) 
(“[I]t should at least be ensured that victims of oppression and persecution obliged 
to leave their home country as refugees should be decently treated by the 
international community.”). 
 66.  See Andrea Binder, Gender and the Membership in a Particular Social 
Group Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 
169 (2001) (“This refugee definition was drafted against the background of the 
atrocities committed by Nazi-Germany.”).  
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explicitly list gender as a ground for asylum.67 This is a reflection 
of a framework “drawn primarily from the realm of public sphere 
activities dominated by men,” and does not necessarily account for 
certain private oppression that is unique to women.68 Moreover, a 
sharp distinction has been drawn between public and private 
oppression, signaling an inability to recognize the political, public 
nature of oppression such as domestic violence or rape.69 This 
distinction coupled with the Convention’s framework ignores the 
role that gender plays even in non-domestic, enumerated forms of 
oppression like political opinion.70  
In 1991, as a response to narrow interpretations of the 
Convention leading to gaps in asylum protection, the United 
Nations issued guidelines expressly directing countries to adopt 
measures that would protect refugee women.71 Again in 2002, the 
United Nations reiterated the desire to create a more inclusive 
interpretation of the Convention and urged countries to consider 
gender-based claims.72 Once more in 2016, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees expressed that women may 
constitute a particular social group.73 Countries like Canada, the 
 
 67.  See Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution:  Assessing the Asylum 
Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 625, 627 (1993) (“[T]his failure to 
incorporate the gender-related claims of women refugees is a product of the 
general failure of refugee and asylum law to recognize social and economic 
rights . . . .”).  
 68.  See Doreen Indra, Gender:  A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience, 
6 REFUGE:  CAN.’S J. ON REFUGEES 3, 3 (Feb. 1, 1987) (“With regard to private 
sphere activities where women’s presence is more strongly felt, there is primarily 
silence—silence compounded by an unconscious calculus . . . .”). 
 69.  See Kelly, supra note 67, at 628 (“Refusal of Iranian women to wear the 
chador, though a significant form of political protest, is often characterized as a 
simple preference for style of dress.”). 
 70.  See Jacqueline Greatbach, The Gender Difference:  Feminist Critiques of 
Refugee Discourse, 1 INT’L L. J. 518, 520 (1989) (“The bifurcated version of society 
itself ignores the realm of women’s lives outside domesticity, and creates a 
rhetorical and theoretical wall between domestic and social culture.”). 
 71.  See UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, ¶ 3 (July 
1991) (“In addition to these basic needs shared with all refugees, refugee women 
and girls have special protection needs that reflect their gender.”).  
 72.  See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, at 2, 
HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) (“Adopting a gender-sensitive interpretation of the 
1951 Convention does not mean that all women are automatically entitled to 
refugee status.”). 
 73.  See UNHCR, UNCHR’s Views on Gender Based Asylum Claims and 
Defining “Particular Social Group” to Encompass Gender, at 3 (Nov. 2016) (“It is 
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United Kingdom, and Australia have all adopted approaches that 
recognize particular social groups on the basis of gender, but the 
United States notably lags behind.74 
A. Matter of A-B- and Its Implications on Asylum Law in the 
United States 
While the United States has always had a tumultuous 
relationship with immigration, there has been an increased, 
visceral reaction to the country’s immigration policies and 
practices in the Trump administration.75 In 2018, former Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions unilaterally issued a controversial decision 
in Matter of A-B-76 overruling Matter of A-R-C-G-,77 a precedential 
decision from 2014.78 In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals granted asylum to a Guatemalan woman 
who faced shocking abuse from her husband.79 He beat her weekly, 
 
our view that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due 
to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may 
be considered as a ‘particular social group’ . . . .”). 
 74.  See Lobo, supra note 40, at 363 (“The lower U.S. courts rarely recognize 
‘women’ as a particular social group; they either deny gender asylum claims or 
grant relief via a more narrowly-defined particular social group.”); see also 
Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Affs. v. Khawar [2002] HCA 14 (Austl.) 
(“The ‘group’ is capable of being properly defined in a principled manner, 
specifically by reference to the ground upon which the state concerned has 
withdrawn the protection of the law and its agencies.”); see generally Perdomo v. 
Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 n.5 (citing Higbogun v. Canada, [2010] F.C. 445 (Can.)). 
 75.  See B. Shaw Drake & Elizabeth Gibson, Vanishing Protection: Access to 
Asylum at the Border, 21 CUNY L. REV. 91, 92 (2017) (stating that immigrants 
and advocates have been thrust into a state of uncertainty following the election 
of Donald Trump).  
 76.   A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 346 (AG 2018) (holding that victims of private 
violence will not be eligible for asylum and countries’ problems policing certain 
crimes does not establish asylum eligibility).  
 77.   A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014) (recognizing “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a cognizable 
social group).  
 78.  See Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing Matter of A-B-:  An Uncertain Future in 
Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner Violence, 52 U. MICH. J. 
L. REFORM 343, 346 (2019) (“The Attorney General’s decision to overrule Matter 
of A-R-C-G- in Matter of A-B- quashed any hope for fairer and more consistent 
determinations in asylum cases involving intimate partner violence until new 
legislation or regulations are put in place to provide guidance.”). 
 79.  See A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389 (“It is undisputed that the 
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broke her nose, threw paint thinner on her which burned her 
breasts, and raped her.80 She called the police several times, but 
they refused to interfere in a marriage.81 She attempted to flee, 
staying with her father and even moving to Guatemala City, but 
her husband found her each time and threatened to kill her if she 
did not return.82 The Board determined, and the Department of 
Homeland Security agreed, that “married women in Guatemala 
who are unable to leave their relationship” was a cognizable social 
group, finding the respondent eligible for asylum.83 The Board 
executed a thorough inquiry, looking to societal norms, country 
conditions, and treatment of spousal abuse in Guatemala to bolster 
the decision.84 
The decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- was not particularly 
profound or broad, and did not create a sweeping precedent that 
addressed the shortcomings of gender-based asylum claims.85 
Nonetheless, Attorney General Sessions stated that the decision 
“caused confusion because it recognized an expansive new category 
of particular social groups based on private violence.”86 This 
characterization of Matter of A-R-C-G- is largely incorrect because 
courts overwhelmingly distinguished the case due to its narrow 
holding, with only a few applying it in favor of the asylum seeker.87 
 
respondent, who married at age 17, suffered repugnant abuse by her husband.”).  
 80.  See id. (describing the abuse the respondent suffered). 
 81.  See id. (“On one occasion, the police came to her home after her husband 
hit her on the head, but he was not arrested.”).  
 82.  See id. (explaining each instance she fled, leading to her leaving 
Guatemala altogether). 
 83.  See id. at 395 (“The DHS also concedes in this case that the mistreatment 
was, for at least one central reason, on account of her membership in a cognizable 
particular social group.”).  
 84.  See id. at 393–94 (“Supporting the existence of social distinction, and in 
accord with the DHS’ concession that a particular social group exists, the record 
in this case includes unrebutted evidence that Guatemala has a culture of 
‘machismo and family violence.’”). 
 85.  See Vogel, supra note 78, at 373 (“Unfortunately, the narrow holding of 
Matter of A-R-C-G- allowed adjudicators in subsequent cases to disregard any 
guidance the BIA provided in evaluating gender-based asylum claims, in 
particular those involving intimate partner violence.”). 
 86.  See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (AG 2018) (“Since that decision, the 
Board, immigration judges, and asylum officers have relied upon it as an 
affirmative statement of law, even though the decision assumed its conclusion 
and did not perform the necessary legal and factual analysis.”). 
 87.  See Vogel, supra note 78, at 373 (“Contrary to Attorney General Sessions’ 
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Rather, Sessions himself issued a broad, sweeping decision 
attempting to foreclose victims of persecution by 
non-governmental actors from successfully seeking asylum in the 
United States, narrowing an already under-inclusive system.88 The 
decision in Matter of A-B- was immediately criticized for the 
adverse effect it would have on victims of gender-based violence.89 
Sessions was accused of ignoring thirty years of precedent, the 
dynamics of domestic violence, and perpetuating “rejected 
understandings of intimate partner violence inflicted against a 
female partner . . . .”90 Indeed, Sessions’ approach ignores how 
domestic violence is treated in the United States regarding its 
evolution from a private matter to a matter of public interest with 
the passing of the Violence Against Women Act and similar 
legislation.91 
Among other things, Sessions raised the standard for the 
requirement that the government of an applicant’s home country 
is “unable or unwilling” to protect the applicant.92 Instead, he 
changed it to a requirement that the government “condoned or was 
completely helpless” in the matter.93 This approach was contrary 
 
assertions that Matter of A-R-C-G- created confusion, the U.S. circuits courts, the 
BIA, and immigration judges predominantly distinguished Matter of A-R-C-G-, 
and few adjudicators favorably applied the case for the asylum applicant.”). 
 88.  See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining 
to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will 
not qualify for asylum.”). 
 89.  See Ruby Robinson, How the U.S. Attorney General Tried (But Failed) to 
Stop Domestic-Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 98 MICH. B. J. 30, 31 (2019) 
(“A-B- had an immediate adverse effect on all persons seeking protection as 
survivors of domestic and gender-based violence as well as their advocates.”). 
 90.  See Vogel, supra note 78, at 374 (“He ignored entirely the underlying 
cause of intimate partner violence inflicted against female partners:  [G]ender 
and subordination, or the abuser’s view that the woman is subordinate to him in 
the relationship . . . .”). 
 91.  See id. at 409 (“Despite public awareness in the United States of the 
problem of intimate partner violence and substantial progress in federal and state 
law combating it, asylum law trails behind by almost fifty years.”).  
 92.  See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (“The fact that the local police have not 
acted on a particular report of an individual crime does not necessarily mean that 
the government is unwilling or unable to control crime, any more than it would 
in the United States.”). 
 93.  See id. (“The applicant must show that the government condoned the 
private actions "or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the 
victims."). 
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to precedent, and the cases he cited do not actually recognize or 
apply such a standard.94  
Matter of A-B- was challenged and abrogated in Grace v. 
Whitaker.95 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
determined that the Board of Immigration Appeals was entitled 
Chevron deference and held that the Attorney General’s decision 
was arbitrary and capricious because “there is no legal basis for an 
effective categorical ban on domestic violence and gang-related 
claims.”96 However, the District Court’s decision is only in regard 
to credible fear determinations, which are initial determinations 
made by an asylum officer that only require a “significant 
possibility” that an applicant could potentially establish asylum 
eligibility before they move on to actual adjudication.97 Although 
Grace v. Whitaker only addresses the credible fear stage, similar 
arguments would apply in challenges to asylum adjudications.98 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, like other 
courts, evaded the heart of the issue with particular social groups 
and affirmed much of Sessions’ reasoning.99 The Court explained 
the circular reasoning problem of defining particular social groups 
by the harm suffered, using “women who fear being forced into 
prostitution” as an example of a group that is not separated from 
the harm.100 The Court went on to explain that the specific group 
alleged would have to share another common characteristic—such 
 
 94.  See Vogel, supra note 78, at 398 (“[I]t is inconsistent with Matter of 
Acosta, the standard applied in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- upon 
which he so emphatically relied.”). 
 95.  See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding 
that precluding domestic and gang-related claims is an impermissible reading of 
the statute and is arbitrary and capricious). 
 96.  See id. at 126 (“Second, such a general rule runs contrary to the 
individualized analysis required by the INA.”). 
 97.  See id. at 126–27 (“The Attorney General’s decision to deny most 
domestic violence or gang violence claims at the credible fear determination stage 
is fundamentally inconsistent with the threshold screening standard that 
Congress established.”). 
 98.  See Vogel, supra note 78, at 379 (“In other words, Grace v. Whitaker dealt 
the first blow to Attorney General Sessions’s decision in Matter of A-B-, but the 
decision is in the appeal process.”). 
 99.  See Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 905 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (upholding the PSG 
requirements of Matter of A-B-). 
 100.  See id. at 903 (“Stated that way, the group is defined by the harm alleged 
(forced prostitution).”).  
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as being targeted for prostitution because of their political views—
to be valid.101 This line of reasoning came close, but ultimately 
failed to see the obvious:  The common characteristic the group 
shares is the fact that they are women.  
Matter of A-B- represents a backwards slide in American 
immigration jurisprudence.102 Instead of improving the laws, we 
are left patching up a mangled interpretation of them. It is a 
transparent attempt at curbing migration from Central and South 
America at the expense of legitimate, established laws.103 It 
invokes outdated views of domestic violence and places the United 
States further away from honoring its international obligations 
under the Refugee Convention.104 
B. Progress in the Wake of Matter of A-B- 
Former Attorney General Sessions’ decision in Matter of 
A-B- still leaves open the possibility of an interpretation of asylum 
law that includes a broad application of “gender” as a particular 
social group.105 Sessions emphasized and outlined key features of 
a particular social group analysis:  An immutable characteristic; 
defined with particularity; and social distinction.106 He used this 
framework to determine the social group in Matter of A-R-C-G-—
 
 101.  See id. at 903 (explaining that a shared characteristic outside of the harm 
alleged is required to avoid circularity). 
 102.  See Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional:  Constricting the 
‘Particular Social Group’ Ground for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 487, 512 (2019) 
(“In the short term, we are likely to see much higher rates of asylum claims 
related to domestic violence, which had become accepted under Matter of 
A-R-C-G- . . . .”).  
 103.  See id. at 511 (“Policies calling for a ‘border wall’ and stopping migration 
from Mexico and Central America go hand-in-hand with these administrative 
decisions making it harder for people escaping those countries to obtain asylum 
in the United States.”).  
 104.  See id. at 517 (“This backwards slide undercuts the fundamental human 
rights protections that these treaties aim to provide and injects ever greater 
inconsistencies and uncertainty into our asylum system.”).  
 105.  See id. at 514 (“[F]ormer Attorney General Sessions unintentionally 
made some immigration judges more open to consider a much simpler, more 
logical version of the PSG that has long been advocated by immigration lawyers 
and scholars:  [W]omen.”). 
 106.  See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 330 (A.G. 2018) (outlining the necessary 
elements of a particular social group).  
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“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 
relationship,”—was not a cognizable group because Guatemalan 
society would likely not view them as a group, and it did not exist 
independently from the persecution.107  
Under Sessions’ approach, however, a gender-based or a 
domestic violence claim could still be successful if the particular 
social group is simply and cleverly framed.108 Suggestions have 
included formulating particular social groups that “avoid focusing 
on harm but combining gender, nationality, treatment of women 
as property, or political opinion” to maximize success.109 
Unintentionally, Sessions has already caused judges to consider 
simple, broad particular social group claims.110 Immigration judges 
in at least three different cities, potentially more, have recognized 
gender alone as a particular social group since Sessions’ decision, 
a sharp contrast from what he intended.111 
This handful of decisions has not stoked much optimism, 
however. Matter of A-B- still shows a propensity for an already 
imperfect system to perform flawed analyses, exhibit misogynistic 
reasoning, and harm large numbers of people.112 A path to a more 
coherent and just asylum system includes application of the law as 
 
 107.  See id. at 336 (“By contrast, there is significant room for doubt that 
Guatemalan society views these women, as horrible as their personal 
circumstances may be, as members of a distinct group in society . . . .”).  
 108.  See Robinson, supra note 89, at 32 (“First, humanitarian relief like 
asylum and withholding of removal for survivors of domestic and gender violence 
is still available post A-B-.”). 
 109.  See id. at 32 (“Formulations of particular social groups like ‘Guatemalan 
women,’ ‘Guatemalan women unable to leave their relationships,’ and 
‘Guatemalan women viewed as property’ can be sufficient . . . .”).  
 110.  See Marouf, supra note 102, at 514 (“[F]ormer Attorney General Sessions 
unintentionally made some immigration judges more open to consider a much 
simpler, more logical version of the PSG that has long been advocated by 
immigration lawyers and scholars:  [W]omen.”).  
 111.  See id. at 514 (“In at least three asylum decisions issued after Matter of 
A-B-, immigration judges in Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Arlington have 
done just that, finding that gender alone defined the PSG.”); see also, Deborah 
Anker, Federal Bar Association’s 2018 Annual Meeting and Convention (May 18, 
2019), https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Anker_FBA-
Materials_2019-pdf.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (sharing immigration court 
decisions) [perma.cc/FM9N-K5DT]. 
 112.  See Vogel, supra note 78, at 434 (“Matter of A-B- demonstrates that the 
flawed analysis, confusion, and inconsistencies in the adjudications of asylum 
claims based on intimate partner violence persist.”).  
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it is meant to be, regulatory changes addressing the issue of 
gender-related persecution, and a uniform understanding of how 
these claims will be treated moving forward.113 
III. Fitting Gender-Based Asylum Claims in the Current 
Framework 
As discussed above, asylum applicants must meet several 
amorphous requirements to qualify for relief from removal under 
the “particular social group” category.114 Applicants must possess 
an immutable characteristic, social distinction, and sufficient 
particularity to be considered a cognizable social group by 
courts.115 In contrast to the prevailing approach taken in the 
United States, commentators and even some courts recognize that 
gender-based asylum claims meet all of the requirements.116 An 
approach that embraces gender-based claims has been referred to 
as “the only plausible construction” of asylum law.117 
A. Immutable Characteristic 
The “particular social group” category was introduced as a 
mechanism to fill in gaps where asylum claims based on race, 
religion, nationality, or political opinion sometimes fell short.118 
 
 113.  See id. at 434 (outlining recommendations to resolve issues in the 
interpretation and application of the refugee definition). 
 114.  See supra Section II.B (discussing how women easily fit into any 
immigrant social group as recognized by U.S. courts yet, nevertheless, those same 
courts have refused to recognize gender as a distinct immigrant social group 
itself). 
 115.  See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014) (describing and 
delineating the various requirements in the particular social group category).  
 116.  See Allison W. Reimann, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of 
Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1237 
(2009) (“More recently, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have recognized 
that all of the women of a particular nationality or ethnicity may comprise a 
particular social group, at least for claims based on FGM.”).  
 117.  See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
social group comprised of Somalian females . . . not only reflects a plausible 
construction of our asylum law, but the only plausible construction.”). 
 118.  See Thiele, supra note 63, at 227 (“In introducing this amendment, Mr. 
Petren stated, ‘experience has shown that certain refugees have been persecuted 
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While the Refugee Convention did not define this term, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook contains a 
broad interpretation, requiring simply “similarity of background, 
habits or social status.”119 In contrast, U.S. courts, among others, 
have required particular social groups to have a certain degree of 
immutability that mirrors the other enumerated categories.120 
Specifically, particular social groups must be based on an 
“immutable characteristic,” which is one that an individual cannot 
change or should not be required to change.121 For example, it is 
widely accepted that homosexuals are a cognizable social group 
that satisfies all requirements.122 On the other hand, a proposed 
group consisting of wealthy Guatemalans was considered “too 
subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide the sole basis for 
membership in a particular social group.”123 Following established 
reasoning and caselaw, a gender-based claim is certain to satisfy 
any immutability requirement.124 
Indeed, it would be difficult to argue that a characteristic such 
as gender or sex is one that an individual can or should be forced 
to change. These are traits that meet or exceed the immutability 
of other enumerated grounds like religion or political opinion, and 
 
because they belong to a particular social group’ and, thus, a category designed to 
cover them should be included.”). 
 119.  See id. at 228 (“U.N. and U.S. jurisprudence arrive at differing 
interpretations regarding the scope of protection offered by the particular social 
group category.”). 
 120.  See W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 213, 213 (B.I.A. 2014) (stating that 
particularity should be viewed with the specificity that race, religion, and 
nationality are viewed).  
 121.  See id. at 213 (describing the immutability requirement of particular 
social groups). 
 122.  See Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Thus, to 
the extent that our case-law has been unclear, we affirm that all homosexuals are 
members of a ‘particular social group.’”). 
 123.  See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“If ‘wealth’ 
defined the boundaries of a particular social group, a determination about 
whether any petitioner fit into the group . . . would necessitate a sociological 
analysis as to how persons with various assets would have been viewed by others 
in their country.”).  
 124.  See JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE 
STATUS 442 (2d ed. 2014) (“In sum, the recognition that a particular social group 
can be defined simply on the basis of gender or sex, is . . . ‘simply a logical 
application of the seminal reason in Acosta . . . .’” (quoting Regina v. Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) 644)). 
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courts rarely, if ever, dispute the immutability of gender when 
these claims arise.125 The innate, immutable character of a 
gender-based group has been defined as “axiomatic” and 
embodying an ejusdem generis approach.126 Further, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees issued guidelines in 2002 
stating that an immutability standard is sufficient in asylum 
analysis and that other standards, like social visibility, only need 
to be considered when immutability cannot be established.127 In 
fact, these guidelines specifically use women as an example of a 
particular social group under the immutability standard, stating, 
“It follows that sex can properly be within the ambit of the social 
group category, with women being a clear example of a social 
subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who 
are frequently treated differently to men.”128 Although gender 
clearly meets an immutability standard, the U.S. approach adopts 
other, narrower requirements to establish a successful asylum 
claim.129 
B. Social Distinction 
Prior to the adoption of the social distinction test, in 2005 the 
Board of Immigration Appeals introduced a social visibility test, 
 
 125.  See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The 
characteristics of being a ‘young woman’ and a ‘member of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe’ cannot be changed.”). 
 126.  See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 124, at 436 (“Indeed, 
acknowledgment that gender-based groups are clear examples of social subsets 
defined by an innate and immutable characteristic are properly within the ambit 
of the social group category is now decades old.”).  
 127.  See UNHCR, Guidelines for International Protection: “Membership of a 
Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 13, U.N. 
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/publications/legal/3d58de2da/guidelines-international-protection-2-
membership-particular-social-group.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (“If a 
claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic determined to be 
neither unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken . . . .”) 
[perma.cc/72EU-6MLF]. 
 128.  See id. ¶ 12 (explaining how history and fundamental rights can create 
the basis for a particular social group).  
 129.  See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014) (discussing the social 
distinction requirements).  
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which analyzed the visibility and perception of proposed groups in 
their respective societies.130 While the United Nations considers 
something like visibility an additional ground for asylum claims, 
the United States incorporates it as a further limiting 
requirement.131 Scholars criticized the social visibility test for 
lacking a basis in international law and for potentially harming 
victims of sexual or gender-based persecution, like female genital 
mutilation, which is oftentimes hidden out of sight.132  
Although no one would argue that women do not have social 
visibility, this requirement is an impediment because particular 
social groups consisting simply of women from a certain country 
are not widely accepted in the United States.133 This causes women 
to narrow their social groups by including other characteristics 
such as family membership, political opinion, education level, 
etc.134 For example, Rodi Alvarado defined her social group as 
“Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with 
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live 
under male domination.”135 Under a social visibility standard, this 
proposed group falls short, as there are several aspects outside of 
her gender that may not be readily recognizable by the general 
public in Guatemala.136 
 
 130.  See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2005) (“The recent Guidelines 
issued by the United Nations confirm that ‘visibility’ is an important element in 
identifying the existence of a particular social group.”).  
 131.  See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in 
Defining “Particular Social Group” and its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims 
Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 49 (2008) 
(“[S]uggesting in an ambiguous and internally inconsistent decision that the 
‘protected characteristic’ and ‘social visibility’ tests may now represent dual 
requirements in all social group cases.”).  
 132.  See id. at 50 (“Initially, gender-related forms of harm, such as sexual 
violence, domestic abuse, female genital cutting, and honor killings were 
dismissed as ‘private matters’ that did not constitute persecution.”). 
 133.  See id. at 90–91 (“‘The recognition of gender itself as defining a 
[particular social group] has encountered opposition based on a misunderstanding 
that it is overbroad and in effect would recognize every woman in certain 
countries as refugee . . . .’”).  
 134.  See id. at 91 (“[A]pplicants often define groups in ‘overly complicated and 
unnecessarily detailed’ ways . . . .”). 
 135.  See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 2001) (“[W]e find that the 
respondent’s claimed social group fails under our own independent assessment of 
what constitutes a qualifying social group.”). 
 136.  See Marouf, supra note 131, at 97 (“[T]he group is nevertheless likely to 
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In response to a lack of practicality in this approach, courts 
developed a social distinction requirement.137 Courts reiterated 
that ocular visibility is not required, but the analysis requires 
courts to look at whether a proposed group would be considered a 
group by society.138 Even under this softer approach, the social 
distinction requirement may “paradoxically demand that 
[marginalized groups] be recognized by the very people who have 
denied or suppressed their identities.”139 Critics expressed concern 
about the discretion this affords adjudicators given that social 
perception is not a rigid, static quality and requires analysis that 
may be outside of the judges’ expertise.140 While a category 
consisting only of women from a certain country would meet the 
standard, disregarding the social distinction test would simplify 
the asylum analysis, particularly in the United States where 
women are forced to qualify their proposed social groups with 
various other characteristics.141 
C. Particularity 
The particularity requirement adds another hurdle for asylum 
applicants to overcome.142 This requirement attempts to delineate 
 
fail the BIA’s social visibility test because the general population in Guatemala 
would not automatically recognize which women are married and unable to leave 
their relationships.”). 
 137.  See, e.g., W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 216 (B.I.A. 2014) (“We now rename 
that requirement [previously social visibility] ‘social distinction’ to clarify that 
social visibility does not mean ‘ocular’ visibility . . . .”). 
 138.  See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing that 
the requirement is a question of whether the society in question would recognize 
the group as a discrete class of persons).  
 139.  See Marouf, supra note 131, at 105 (explaining the difficulties of a social 
visibility approach). 
 140.  See id. at 106 (“In short, the ‘social visibility’ test effectively gives 
decision-makers total discretion to decide whether or not a particular social group 
exists.”). 
 141.  See id. (“Embracing the BIA’s new approach will not only lead to chaotic 
case law and abdication of the United States’ obligations under the convention, 
but also will cause the legal community to reject the refugee status determination 
as a serious, principled process.”).  
 142.  See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 233 (B.I.A. 2014) (stating that the 
board was seeking to provide greater specificity to the definition of a social 
group.). 
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the outer limits of proposed groups,143 acting as a benchmark to 
clearly determine who falls within the group.144 A group must be 
“discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not be 
amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”145 The Board stated 
not every immutable characteristic meets this standard.146 For 
example, groups based on wealth, poverty, youth, or homelessness 
are considered “too vague and all encompassing” to set the 
perimeters of a particular social group.147 Ironically, the Ninth 
Circuit, which has shown favorability towards gender-based 
asylum claims, stated that major segments of a population will 
rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group.148  
The introduction of this standard, much like other attempts at 
delineating social groups, created confusion among courts.149 The 
Third Circuit was particularly critical and refused to adopt the 
“particularity” standard, stating: 
We do not believe that the government is using particularity to 
impose a numerical or size limitation on the meaning of 
“particular social group.” However, we are hard-pressed to 
discern any difference between the requirement of 
“particularity” and the discredited requirement of “social 
visibility.” Indeed, they appear to be different articulations of 
the same concept and the government’s attempt to distinguish 
the two oscillates between confusion and obfuscation, while at 
times both confusing and obfuscating. Indeed, “Particularity” 
appears to be little more than a reworked definition of “social 
 
 143.  See id. at 238 (“The ‘particularity’ requirement relates to the group’s 
boundaries . . . .”). 
 144.  See W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014) (defining particularity). 
 145.  See id. (“A particular social group must be defined by characteristics that 
provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group.”).  
 146.  See M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 239–40 (“[N]ot every ‘immutable 
characteristic’ is sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.” (citing 
Escobar v. Gonzales, 713 F.3d 363, 383 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
 147.  See id. (clarifying what the particularity requirement seeks to 
accomplish).  
 148.  See Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005) (“‘To hold 
otherwise would be tantamount to extending refugee status to every alien 
displaced by general conditions of unrest or violence in his or her home country.’” 
(quoting Sancho-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 149.  See Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confusing 
Legal Standard for ‘Membership in a Particular Social Group’, 14-06 IMMIGR. 
BRIEFING 1 (2014) (stating that the particularity and social visibility requirements 
ensures a new round of litigation aimed at restoring simplicity).  
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visibility” and the former suffers from the same infirmity as the 
latter. The government’s use of “particularity” is inconsistent 
with the prior BIA decisions discussed in the “social visibility” 
portion of this opinion. We therefore hold that adopting a 
“particularity’ requirement is unreasonable because it is 
inconsistent with many of the BIA’s prior decisions.150 
Further, the Third Circuit denied the Board Chevron 
deference because the agency departed from its prior decisions 
without stating a principled reason for doing so.151 In fact, after 
introducing the “particularity” standard in 2008, the Board did not 
recognize a new social group until 2014.152 
The uncertainty caused by the Board’s particularity 
requirement has led to vastly inconsistent approaches and 
applications among courts.153 For example, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected a group defined as “Salvadoran males between the ages of 
8 and 15 who have been recruited by Mara 18 but have refused to 
join because of their principal opposition to the gang and what they 
want.”154 The Court determined the proposed group was not 
particular enough, stating it was “exceedingly broad and 
encompass[ed] a diverse cross-section of society.”155 In contrast, the 
Tenth Circuit stated that a group consisting of “Salvadoran women 
between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang recruitment” met 
the particularity standard.156 However, the proposed group was 
 
 150.  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 151.  See id. (explaining that the Board’s departure from precedent was 
unreasonable). 
 152.  See Particular Social Group Practice Advisory:  Applying for Asylum 
After Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Jan. 
22, 2016), https://immigrantjustice.org/for-attorneys/legal-
resources/file/particular-social-group-practice-advisory-applying-asylum-1 (last 
visited Sep. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Practice Advisory] (“In August 2014, the BIA 
issued the first published decision recognizing a new particular social group . . . 
.”) [perma.cc/V6Z8-SLA8]. 
 153.  See Casper et al., supra note 149, at Part III (contrasting various Circuit 
Courts’ decisions). 
 154.  See Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The 
proposed groups for Jose and Andres do not meet the test established by the BIA, 
and we cannot say that the rejection of such a group is arbitrary and capricious.”). 
 155.  See id. (describing that gang recruitment reaches young men of all 
backgrounds in El Salvador).  
 156.  See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(disagreeing with the BIA’s conclusion that the group was not defined with 
sufficient particularity).  
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rejected in the end because it did not meet the “social visibility” 
standard.157 
The latter case illustrates a problem that arises in 
gender-based claims under the combination of the various 
standards. While a proposed social group consisting simply of 
women from a particular country undoubtedly has well-defined 
boundaries and social distinction, the refusal of courts to recognize 
this group forces women to qualify their proposed groups with 
other characteristics like relationship status or familial ties, for 
example.158 Although particularity and social distinction have 
significant overlap, language that a society would use to define a 
group (“young women,” for example) is not always language that 
would define a group with the requisite legal particularity.159 
Inversely, when a group is defined with precision (“women between 
the ages of 20 and 25”), there is a challenge in establishing that 
society would view that group distinctly from women between the 
ages of 26 and 30, for example.160 Critics of the particularity and 
social distinction requirements claim they place an immense 
burden on asylum-seekers and immigration judges alike, due to 
the amount of information it takes to prove country conditions and 
the sociological aspect of the analysis required.161 Although purely 
gender-based asylum claims meet the particularity standard by 
definition, the requirement is too vague and confusing to be 
applied with any consistency, leading some courts to reject it 
entirely.162 
 
 157.  See id. at 653 (“The fact that Rivera-Barrientos was targeted thus does 
not provide evidence that society perceives her to be a member of a particular 
social group.”).  
 158.  See Marouf, supra note 131, at 91 (“[A]pplicants often define groups in 
‘overly complicated and unnecessarily detailed ways . . . .’” (quoting MICHELLE 
FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 326–28 
(2007))). 
 159.  See Practice Advisory, supra note 152, at 5 (“For example, ‘young’ does 
not say how young; ‘wealthy’ does not say how wealthy.”).  
 160.  See id. (“Thus, the particularity requirement . . . effectively precludes the 
use of common parlance labels to describe a PSG, even as the social distinction 
test requires that a PSG be limited by parameters a society would recognize.”).  
 161.  See Casper et al., supra note 149, at Part V (“Not only is this process 
onerous on applicants, but it forces judges to evaluate issues outside their 
expertise.”). 
 162.  See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a 
particular social group consisting of “young Albanian women who live alone” can 
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IV. Resistance to Broad Gender-Based Claims 
Women can satisfy any type of social group test that U.S. 
courts can apply.163 Women have immutable characteristics and 
are socially distinct.164 Further, as a group, women are 
well-defined, and, unfortunately, subject to persecution around the 
globe.165 It is a principle of the refugee treaties that all human 
beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without 
persecution, and there is a need to offer such protection to 
women.166 Currently, valid asylum claims can be based on 
persecution due to an applicant’s race, nationality, religion, or 
political opinion in addition to particular social group.167 Women 
meet or exceed requirements when compared to the 
unquestionably recognized enumerated grounds.168 In fact, other 
countries have embraced gender-based groups by recognizing that 
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion are also extremely 
broad traits.169 The United Nations has repeatedly encouraged 
countries to recognize the unique plight of women and to accept 
 
constitute a social group). 
 163.  See Sarah Siddiqui, Membership in a Particular Social Group:  All 
Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 525 (2010) 
(“U.S. courts all take an approach that applies to women and yields outcomes that 
should be favorable to female asylum-seekers.”). 
 164.  See id. at 526 (explaining how women satisfy all PSG requirements). 
 165.  See id. (“Women have a ‘fundamental right to protection from abuse 
based on gender . . . .’”) (quoting R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906, 931 (BIA 2001))).  
 166.  United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see Thiele, supra note 63, at 221 (“The 
principle that women’s rights are human rights is now widely accepted, at least 
at the international level of discourse.”). 
 167.  See infra Part I and accompanying text (establishing that an asylum 
seeker must meet the definition of “refugee” under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). 
 168.  See W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 213, 213 (B.I.A. 2014) (stating that 
particularity should be viewed with the specificity that race, religion, and 
nationality are viewed). 
 169.  See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 124, at 438–39 (explaining Spain’s 
resolution of concerns regarding the breadth of the group). 
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asylum claims based on gender.170 Many countries have adopted 
this approach.171 Notably, the United States has not.172 
Although the law, international practice, and common sense 
all point to accepting a claim based solely on gender, the pushback 
in U.S. courts is based largely on the size of a group consisting of 
all women in a country.173 This is a concern about potentially 
“opening the floodgates,” and it has been a constant in American 
immigration jurisprudence.174 The basic premise of this concern is 
that if a category such as “women” is recognized, the United States 
will be flooded with claims from individuals merely because they 
fall under this broad characterization, not because of actual 
persecution.175  
The Ninth Circuit articulated this concern in Sanchez Trujillo 
v. I.N.S.,176 stating that a class consisting of “young, urban, 
working-class males of military age who had maintained political 
neutrality” was so broad as to “encompass so many variables that 
to recognize any person who might conceivably establish that he 
 
 170.  See supra Part II (discussing the various guidelines issued by the UN 
throughout the years). 
 171.  See generally UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: 
Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 38, U.N. 
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002), 
https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d58ddef4/guidelines-international-
protection-1-gender-related-persecution-context.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) 
(“UNHCR encourages States who have not already done so to ensure a gender-
sensitive application of refugee law and procedures . . . .”) [perma.cc/4QUP-
WBGM]. 
 172.  See Lobo, supra note 40, at 363 (“The lower U.S. courts rarely recognize 
‘women’ as a particular social group; they either deny gender asylum claims or 
grant relief via a more narrowly-defined particular social group.”). 
 173.  See Peter C. Godfrey, Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings:  
The Expansion of the Social Group to Include a Broader Class of Refugees, 3 J. L. 
POL’Y 257, 280 (1994) (“Group size is perhaps the greatest obstacle to extension of 
the ‘particular social group’ to include those who fear persecution on account of 
membership in a broadly based group such as gender or sexual orientation.”). 
 174.  See id. (“The concern with allowing an expansive interpretation . . . is 
that it will ‘open the floodgates’ to vast demographic divisions of people . . . .”). 
 175.  See id. (“[I]f immigration statutes are so broadly construed as to provide 
asylum in such instances, any individual persecuted on account of gender or 
sexual orientation may successfully allege an asylum claim . . . .”). 
 176.  Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
class of young, urban, working-class males of military age who had maintained 
political neutrality was not a PSG). 
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was a member of this class is entitled to asylum and withholding 
of deportation would render the definition of ‘refugee’ 
meaningless.”177 This attitude stems from the fear that if such a 
broad group is allowed, individuals who are merely dissatisfied 
with social or economic conditions could use a mechanism designed 
for bona fide refugees to enter the United States.178  
The concern about allowing a broad particular social group 
that will open the floodgates to an unmanageable number of 
asylum-seekers, while facially logical, is unfounded.179 First, there 
is no historical foundation for such a concern.180 Countries that 
have adopted an approach recognizing social groups based on 
gender have not experienced an inundation of women asylum 
seekers.181 For example, in 1993, Canada was the first country to 
recognize asylum claims from victims of gender-related 
persecution.182 Canada kept track of statistics on gender-based 
asylum, and “reported that there was no explosion of claims; to the 
contrary, gender claims consistently constituted only a minuscule 
fraction of Canada’s total claims, and had actually declined in the 
seven-year period following the adoption of the Gender 
Guidelines.”183 This result is not paradoxical.184 By their nature, 
persecuted groups have limited rights and mobility, constricting 
the members’ ability to seek protection.185  
 
 177.  See id. at 1577 (explaining why a broad social group is unfavorable).  
 178.  See Godfrey, supra note 173, at 280–81 (“Such a construction could be 
used to circumvent the narrow selection process used to determine who is a bona 
fide ‘refugee’ . . . .”).  
 179.  See Siddiqui, supra note 163, at 527 (“However, this belief—that 
adopting the international guidelines and caselaw as models will result in a 
substantial rise in the number of female asylum applicants—is unfounded.”). 
 180.  See id. (“History reveals that the acceptance of gender asylum does not 
give rise to a deluge of claims.”). 
 181.  See id. (“For example, Canada’s experience corroborates the conclusion 
that countries that recognize gender asylum claims do not experience floods of 
women refugees.”).  
 182.  See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution:  Fear of 
Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 133 (2007) 
(explaining that Canada has kept statistics on gender asylum since its 
introduction in the country in 1993).  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  See id. (“There are several explanations why the number of women 
asylum seekers has not dramatically increased . . . .”). 
 185.  See id. (explaining the difficulties of seeking asylum for persecuted 
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The second reason why the “floodgates” concern is 
unwarranted is because there is no real legal basis that allows 
courts to legitimize this concern.186 Even U.S. courts have noted 
that size and breadth of a group are not determining factors in the 
group’s legitimacy.187 Further, the fact that some women may be 
able to avoid persecution does not negate the validity of a 
gender-based group.188 Membership in a particular social group 
alone is not enough to satisfy asylum requirements; applicants 
must individually prove that they have suffered harm that rises to 
the level of persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution, and that this harm was on account of their 
membership in a particular social group, along with certain other 
requirements.189 An additional hurdle that comes along with this 
burden of proof is that many of these asylum seekers will have very 
little physical evidence, and instead will have to rely on the asylum 
adjudicators’ assessments of the applicants’ credibility.190 Because 
immigration proceedings are administrative hearings, many 
asylum seekers appear pro se and therefore may not know how to 
testify in a manner that persuades an immigration judge.191  
 A third reason why the refusal to recognize gender as a 
valid asylum claim lacks merit is the effect on judicial economy and 
the “constant re-litigating” of claims that results from overly 
 
groups). 
 186.  See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 126, at 440 (“It is not a phenomenon 
generally found in respect of other Convention grounds, nor does it tend to arise 
in respect of other applications of the social group category.”). 
 187.  See Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 253 (4th Cir. 2019) (stating that 
an immigration judge’s determination that a group was not small enough to 
establish a PSG was legally incorrect). 
 188.  See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 126, at 441 (“[N]or is the fact that 
some women in the relevant group are able to avoid persecution an ‘answer to 
treating women . . . as a relevant social group.’” (quoting Regina v. Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (644))). 
 189.  See id. (“All other elements of the definition, must of course, be 
satisfied.”). 
 190.  See Helen P. Grant, The Floodgates Are Not Going to Open, But Will the 
U.S. Border?, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 22–23 (2006) (explaining the evidentiary 
burdens of asylum seekers who are fleeing domestic violence).  
 191.  See id. at 22 (“[T]he applicant has generally fled her country of origin 
without much thoughtful planning and in total ignorance of what will be required 
to persuade the U.S. asylum adjudicator that she should be afforded protection.”). 
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specific gender-based groups.192 This leads to a social group 
analysis that “degenerates into an ‘obstacle course in which the 
postulated group undergoes constant redefinition.’”193 Currently, 
social group analysis that is based around gender is often a 
pedantic evaluation of minutiae, when in reality the persecution 
faced by applicants is simply on account of their gender.194 Scholars 
claim this creates an impediment for women seeking asylum and 
raises issues of gender equality because gender claims are 
disproportionately evaluated under intense scrutiny.195 
V. Proposal 
In order to resolve the shortcomings of gender-based asylum 
jurisprudence, this Note first proposes a judicial resolution to 
simplify what has become an inconsistent, inequitable, and 
incorrect application of asylum law in the United States. This 
requires a definition of “particular social group” that clearly 
encapsulates asylum claims based plainly on gender, along with 
the explicit recognition that gender-based groups are valid. Next, 
a statutory or regulatory amendment is suggested to include 
gender as a cognizable ground upon which to apply for asylum. 
Additionally, prosecutorial discretion by the Department of 
Homeland Security is suggested as an effective and immediate way 
to alleviate the issue at hand. Next, more general changes are 
suggested, such as a re-examination of the standards of review 
given to immigration courts, as well as an enactment of a public 
defender program for those courts.  
 
 
 192.  See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 126, at 442 (describing the constant 
re-litigation of claims as an especially pernicious concern of overly specific 
gender-based groups). 
 193.  Id. (quoting Liu v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 1 WLR 2858 
(AC) 2864 [12]).  
 194.  See id. (“[D]ecision-makers and advocates engage in ‘nitpicking around 
the margins of the definition,’ when in truth the reason for an applicant’s risk is 
simply her membership in the social group ‘women.’” (quoting Liu v. Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 1 WLR 2858 (AC) 2864 [12])).  
 195.  See id. (“[R]aises questions of gender equality given that it is 
disproportionately gender-based claims that are subjected to such scrutiny and 
re-litigation.”).  
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A. Judicial Resolution 
Purely gender-based asylum claims are not without precedent. 
In Matter of Acosta,196 the Board of Immigration Appeals noted 
that “particular social group” was undefined by Congress or the 
Refugee Protocol, but explicitly listed “sex” as an example of a 
characteristic on which a social group is based.197 The Board came 
to this determination by construing the term “particular social 
group” in a manner consistent with the more specific, enumerated 
grounds for asylum.198 In fact, even the Supreme Court of Canada 
adopted the Acosta approach because of how well it reflected the 
spirit and purpose of the Refugee Convention.199 
In the United States, courts lack a defining guideline and new, 
binding precedent to offer protection to qualified female 
asylum-seekers. Ideally, the U.S. Supreme Court could 
unequivocally rule that gender is a valid particular social group 
per se. Although the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari for 
asylum cases, there are countless eligible cases that flow to the 
Federal Courts of Appeals each year.200  
A more realistic approach is for the Appellate Circuits to adopt 
a definition of particular social groups along with the recognition 
that gender-based claims are facially valid. Courts should embrace 
an enhancement to their current definitions of particular social 
group that explicitly states, “Traits such sex or gender are 
prototypical examples of valid characteristics upon which 
particular social groups are based.” This would be a minor addition 
 
 196.  See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (establishing that 
persecution on account of a particular social group is directed toward individuals 
with common, immutable characteristics). 
 197.  See id. at 232–34 (“The shared characteristic might be one such as sex, 
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past 
experience . . . .”).  
 198.  See id. at 232 (“Thus, the other four grounds of persecution enumerated 
in the Act and the Protocol restrict refugee status to individuals who are either 
unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, 
to avoid persecution.”).  
 199.  See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 126, at 427 (“[I]t takes into account 
the ‘general underlying themes of the defense of human rights and 
anti-discrimination that form the basis for the international refugee protection 
initiative.’” (quoting Att’y Gen. v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 736–38 (Can.))). 
 200.  See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (remanding a case to the 
BIA to determine if family membership constitutes a PSG). 
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to the current language that defines groups based on 
characteristics the applicant cannot or should not be forced to 
change.201 For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
taken a lead on this issue, recognizing all women within a country 
as a cognizable social group.202 Since 2010, the Ninth Circuit has 
remanded decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals that 
rejected gender-based groups as overly broad.203 
B. Statutory Amendment/Regulation 
The most effective way to solidify gender as a legitimate social 
group is to amend the current law to include gender-based claims. 
The term “particular social group” appears without definition in 
both the United States Code and the Code of Federal 
Regulations.204 Because “particular social group” is a historically 
confusing term, adding a definition that includes gender-based 
groups as a prototypical example would provide protection to a 
deserving group and clarify an ambiguity in the courts. 
Some commentators have proposed adopting a new category 
altogether.205 A sixth category encapsulating gender alone, outside 
of the particular social group sphere, would eliminate the need to 
mold gender-based claims into existing categories. Although a new 
category would require a new judicial framework, the new asylum 
ground would be a familiar term, not requiring the elaborate 
definitions of particular social groups. Further, the United States 
would lead the world in this approach, given that most countries 
 
 201.  See Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 
2019) (“The shared characteristic uniting the social group ‘must be one that the 
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to 
change . . . .’”(quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985))).  
 202.  See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the BIA’s rejection of “all women in Guatemala” was misguided). 
 203.  See Torres Valdivia v. Barr, 777 F. App’x 251, 252 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(determining that the BIA’s rejection of a group consisting of “women from 
Mexico” was legally erroneous). 
 204.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A) (2019); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(2018). 
 205.  See Vogel, supra note 78, at 417 (“First, scholars have proposed that 
gender should be a sixth ground for asylum in addition to race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, and particular social group.”). 
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have adopted gender as a particular social group, not a separate 
group itself.206 
The likelihood of such a statutory or regulatory amendment in 
the Joe Biden administration is unclear. Biden’s immigration plan 
proposes to “modernize” the American immigration system.207 
More specifically, Biden promises to restore asylum eligibility for 
domestic violence survivors.208 This change would certainly help to 
strengthen the asylum claims of many women and reverse some of 
the damage done by the Trump administration, but it still falls 
short of recognizing women as a group all on their own. Biden’s 
immigration proposals do signal a willingness to consider alternate 
options, and perhaps the administration would be amenable to a 
provision in an immigration reform package that explicitly 
protects women across the globe. 
C. Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law 
 An often-overlooked area of immigration enforcement is the 
role prosecutorial discretion takes in the immigration context.209 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can exercise 
discretion, both widely and in specific cases, for a variety of 
reasons.210 For example, DHS may decide to refrain from pursuing 
actions against certain groups of immigrants to save resources, or 
they may decide that certain qualities may redeem an individual 
who is otherwise ineligible for removal.211 Further, enforcement 
 
 206.  See Vogel supra note 78, at 418 (“Moreover, the addition of gender as a 
sixth ground for asylum would set apart the refugee definition in U.S. asylum law 
from other countries in a very important way.”). 
 207.  See generally The Biden Plan for Securing Our values as a Nation of 
Immigrants, BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/immigration/ (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2020).  
 208.  See id. (“Department of Justice will reinstate explicit asylum 
protections—rescinded by the Trump administration—for domestic violence and 
sexual violence survivors . . . .”).  
 209.  See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L. 243, 243–44 (2010) (“The concept of 
‘prosecutorial discretion’ appears in the immigration statute, agency memoranda, 
and court decisions about select immigration enforcement decisions.”). 
 210.  See id. at 244–45 (explaining theories behind the exercise of discretion 
by the DHS).  
 211.  See id. at 244–45 (describing various situations where the DHS may 
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priorities shift with each presidential administration.212 Under the 
Bush administration, DHS focused on workplace and home raids, 
but under the Obama administration, the focus was on noncitizens 
who enter the criminal justice system.213 
Additionally, agency leaders can issue memoranda to guide 
the enforcement priorities of the relevant agents.214 This 
memoranda can “[designate] categories of persons warranting 
special consideration and providing for a scenario-based training 
program[].”215 This mechanism can be the most immediate way 
gender-based asylum claims are recognized. DHS officials can 
issue a memorandum directing the agency to not challenge 
proposed particular social groups that consist simply of women 
from a certain country. This would be effective, within the bounds 
of the law, and infinitely more mild than previous DHS policies 
that were adopted, such as intentionally separating families at the 
border.216 The DHS under the Biden administration should adopt 
a policy of prosecutorial discretion that recognizes and allows 
gender-based asylum claims. 
D. General Immigration Proposals 
The following section will describe generalized proposals to the 
immigration system that would indirectly help to solve the issue 
presented in this Note. A change to the standards of review, legal 
representation, and status of the immigration courts would 
improve the immigration system overall, thereby strengthening 
the claims of women from across the globe. 
 
exercise discretion).  
 212.  See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
661, 687 (2015) (describing the areas the Bush and Obama administrations 
focused on prosecuting).  
 213.  See id. at 687–89 (outlining the differences between the enforcement 
priorities of the two presidential administrations).  
 214.  See id. at 692 (“Over the next year, agency leaders issued a series of 
memoranda setting forth positive and negative factors to be balanced in the 
exercise of discretion . . . .”).  
 215.  Id. at 692.  
 216.  See generally Cora Currier, Prosecuting Parents—and Separating 
Families—Was Meant to Deter Migration, Signed Memo Confirms, THE INTERCEPT 
(Sept. 25, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/25/family-separation-border-
crossings-zero-tolerance/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) [perma.cc/Z5L8-K7SX]. 
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1. Standard of Review 
A hurdle and potential area for effective judicial change is the 
highly deferential standards of review that appellate courts afford 
the immigration courts. A stricter standard of review, coupled with 
an understanding that gender-based asylum claims are the most 
reasonable application of the law, would ensure that immigration 
courts faithfully apply the law. Currently, questions of fact—
including mixed questions of fact and law—receive “substantial 
evidence” review, while interpretations of immigration statutes 
receive Chevron deference.217 Asylum adjudication at the agency 
level is notoriously backlogged, short on resources, and each 
individual judge is encumbered with a 700 case-per-year quota.218 
This leads to significant disparities in immigration decisions, with 
asylum grant rates deviating by more than fifty percent between 
similarly situated applicants.219 Notably, in 2005 Judge Richard 
Posner levied a scathing criticism of the immigration courts, 
stating that the tension between judicial and administrative 
adjudicators is due to administrative decisions falling below the 
minimum standards of legal justice.220 Judge Posner’s frustration 
stemmed from the fact that in the preceding year, forty percent of 
decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals were reversed by 
the Seventh Circuit, compared to just eighteen percent in civil 
cases.221 This figure is particularly striking due to the deferential 
standards of review given to agency findings. 
 
 217.  See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (establishing that 
substantial evidence review is appropriate in immigration cases); see also, I.N.S. 
v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (stating that Chevron deference is 
afforded to the agency’s construction of the statute which it administers).  
 218.  See Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 581, 585 (2013) (“[R]ecent studies that have cast doubt on 
the agency’s competence and expertise, including the shortage of resources and 
time for immigration judges to adequately consider each case . . . .”).  
 219.  See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette:  Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 328 (2007) (“[W]e are primarily concerned 
with court-wide grant rates that deviate by more than 50% from the national 
average grant rate for any of these countries.”). 
 220.  See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the 
minimum standards of legal justice.”). 
 221.  See id. at 829 (expounding on the high rate of reversal in immigration 
cases).  
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Enacting a stricter standard of review is a path appellate 
courts should take to ensure that immigration courts are 
accurately adjudicating claims, especially in light of the difficulties 
faced by immigration judges. Interpretations of particular social 
groups are issues of law, and therefore receive Chevron deference. 
When courts are applying Chevron deference, they can successfully 
hold that a rejection of a gender-based social group is not a 
reasonable construction of the agency’s statutes.222 Courts can 
conduct an analysis—not dissimilar to the one performed by this 
Note—that looks to precedent, international standards, and 
common sense to reach the conclusion that the current 
interpretation is unreasonable. After the Ninth Circuit held that 
the denial of a gender-based group was legally erroneous, the 
opinion was never successfully challenged and remains good 
law.223 Although this approach has been successful for the Ninth 
Circuit, a less deferential standard of review would bolster asylum 
seekers’ claims by allowing appellate courts to more closely review 
all of the surrounding facts and circumstances of an applicant’s 
claim.224 This is imperative even if gender-based claims are 
accepted, because the stricter standard of review would be 
beneficial in analyzing immigration courts’ reasoning of 
individualized factors, such as the applicant’s persecution and 
whether it was on account of their membership in the proposed 
group.225 
Illustrative of this point is the Second Circuit’s 
characterization of the “substantial evidence” standard in 2003.226 
The Court described “substantial evidence” as slightly stricter 
than a “clear error” standard.227 In the eight subsequent 
 
 222.  See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the BIA’s rejection of “all women in Guatemala” was misguided). 
 223.  See Martinez-Mefia v. Barr, 2020 WL 5054885, at *1 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(applying the tested used in Perdomo).  
 224.  See supra Section V.A.1 (arguing a stricter standard of review would 
ensure the law is faithfully applied). 
 225.  See supra Part IV (arguing that gender-based claims fulfill social group 
tests applied more broadly); see also supra Part V.A.1 (arguing a stricter standard 
of review would ensure the law is faithfully applied). 
 226.  See Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining the 
substantial evidence standard of review). 
 227.  See id. (“Substantial evidence review in the immigration context is 
‘slightly stricter’ than the clear-error standard that the circuit courts typically 
354 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 317 (2020) 
immigration cases where this stricter standard was applied, six 
were reversed.228 Additionally, courts have seemingly already 
applied a stricter standard of review to other agencies.229 Scholars 
state that courts have applied a “hard look” review to certain EPA 
and NLRB decisions, resulting in a reversal rate of forty-six 
percent in these cases.230 An agency’s expertise is the principle 
reason for applying deferential standards, but given the lack of 
resources in immigration courts and the fact that immigration 
cases can make up to forty percent of an appellate court’s docket, 
the expertise of the two adjudicative bodies is not significantly 
disparate.231  
Further, the “substantial evidence” standard is fairly 
malleable, giving courts the ability to articulate a standard that 
results in a more comprehensive review of the immigration courts’ 
decisions.232 For example, various agencies have defined the 
standard in different ways, ranging from “less than a 
preponderance” to a “reasonable minds” review.233 This flexibility 
would allow appellate courts to outline a standard of review that 
resembles a “hard look,” and operates as more than a mere 
rubberstamp of agency decisions.234 Although the particular social 
group analysis receives Chevron deference as discussed above, a 
change to the standard of review for issues of fact will further 
strengthen gender-based asylum claims, albeit indirectly. 
 
apply in reviewing a district court’s factual findings . . . .”). 
 228.  See Kim, supra note 218, at 592–93 (“In six of the eight cases, the court 
reversed the IJ’s factual findings. This reversal rate of 75% is remarkably high.”). 
 229.  See id. at 644 (“Moreover, courts appear to be applying hard look review 
to other agencies, which provides precedent for the stricter review standard 
articulated in immigration.”).  
 230.  See id. (“Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have argued that courts 
appear to be applying hard look review when applying the substantial evidence 
and arbitrary and capricious standards.”). 
 231.  See id. at 633 (“In 2005, close to 40% of the Second Circuit’s docket was 
immigration cases. The Ninth Circuit was not far behind.”).  
 232.  See id. at 640 (“Courts have iterated the substantial evidence standard 
in a variety of ways in a variety of contexts.”).  
 233.  See id. at 640 (describing the various ways differing bodies have defined 
the substantial evidence standard).  
 234.  See Tae-Hyun Kim supra note 218, at 585 (“[R]ecent studies that have 
cast doubt on the agency’s competence and expertise, including the shortage of 
resources and time for immigration judges to adequately consider each 
case . . . .”).  
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2. Legal Representation 
In immigration proceedings, applicants are not entitled to 
legal representation.235 However, local and state governments can 
allocate funding to provide free or low-cost attorneys to individuals 
in immigration courts.236 In 2013, New York City unveiled the New 
York Family Unity Project, funded by the City Council and aimed 
at providing representation to immigrants appearing in the city’s 
immigration courts.237 Before the program, detained immigrants 
who did not have a lawyer faced removal at a rate of ninety-seven 
percent.238 In the first three years of the program, the removal rate 
dropped to fifty-two percent.239  
Although immigration proceedings are administrative 
hearings, asylum claims are often matters of life and death.240 A 
public defense program for immigrants would be an improvement 
for immigration hearings generally, and victims of gender-based 
persecution would be beneficiaries. Even if courts were to accept 
gender as a valid basis for a particular social group, 
asylum-seekers would face far better odds with an attorney 
crafting their case and dealing with the intricacies of a niche area 
of the law.241 The importance of representation was noted by Chief 
Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit in 2012, who said, 
 
 235.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (ensuring right to attorney in all criminal 
trials).  
 236.  See infra note 237 and accompanying text (describing New York’s success 
with a project “that provides pro bono lawyers for detainees.”).  
 237.  See Mazin Sidahmed, Opinion, ‘It’s Like an Automatic Deportation if You 
Don’t Have a Lawyer’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/opinion/facing-the-injustice-of-
immigration-court.html (last visited Sep. 6, 2020) (describing the New York 
Family Unity Project) [perma.cc/F4UH-97B4].  
 238.  See id. (“97 percent of detained immigrants who lacked a lawyer were 
being deported.”).  
 239.  See id. (“The rate of success–defined as the immigrant’s being allowed to 
stay in the United States–had risen by 1,100 percent.”).  
 240.  See Nicole Acevedo & Adiel Kaplan, Hundreds deported from U.S. to El 
Salvador have been killed or abused, new report says, NBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/hundreds-deported-u-s-el-salvador-have-
been-killed-or-n1126906 (last visited Sep. 6, 2020) (describing Human Rights 
Watch report stating that 138 people deported to El Salvador have been killed, 
while 70 more have been seriously abused) [perma.cc/5A4A-H3B3]. 
 241.  See Sidahmed, supra note 237 (stating that immigrants with 
representation were eleven times more likely to have a successful claim).  
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“In all too many cases, I had the sense that if only the immigrant 
had competent counsel at the very outset of immigration 
proceedings, the outcome might have been different, the noncitizen 
might have prevailed.”242  
Cities in which immigration courts are located should enact 
programs to provide counsel to the immigrants appearing before 
their adjudicative bodies. The success of the program in New York 
serves as an incentive, and basic notions of justice all but demand 
it. 
3. Status of the Immigration Courts 
Another general improvement that would benefit immigration 
adjudication in the United States broadly is to remove the courts 
from the executive branch and assign them as Article I courts. 
Currently, immigration courts operate under the Department of 
Justice and the Attorney General, raising questions about the 
impartiality of immigration judges.243 Although asylum denial 
rates increased toward the end of the Obama administration, they 
have exploded under the Trump administration, rising from fifty 
percent in 2015 to sixty-nine percent in 2019.244 The total number 
of asylum cases decided also rose significantly, from 19,779 in 2015 
to 67,406 in 2019.245 The push by the Trump administration to 
decide a record number of cases along with the hardline stance 
taken on immigration (such as Matter of A-B-) are reflected in 
these numbers.246 
 
 242.  Id.  
 243.  See Leonard Birdsong, Reforming the Immigration Courts of the United 
States: Why is There No Will to Make it an Article I Court?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 17, 
19 (2013) (“This method of judicial appointment has always appeared to me to 
create a conflict of interest.”). 
 244.  See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, RECORD NUMBER 
OF ASYLUM CLAIMS IN FY 2019 fig. 1 (2019) 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/588/ (last visited Sep. 6, 2020) (charting 
immigration court asylum decisions between 2001 and 2019) [perma.cc/HHM6-
4B7K]. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  See Kate Smith, Asylum denial rates hit record-high in 2018 as Trump 
administration tightens immigration policy (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/asylum-seekers-asylum-denials-hit-record-high-
in-2018-as-trump-administration-tightens-immigration-policy-as-the-caravan-
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To soften the influence the executive branch can have over 
immigration courts, proposals have been made to transform the 
courts into Article I courts, like the Bankruptcy Court or Tax 
Court.247 This change would afford the immigration tribunals a 
degree of independence and an identity that is separate from the 
President’s or the Attorney General’s.248 Judges would have fixed 
terms of office, more autonomy to control their dockets, and 
liberation from the bureaucracy present in the immigration courts 
today.249 This proposal has gained support among many scholars 
and organizations, including the Federal Bar Association.250 
VI. Conclusion 
Immigration adjudication in the United States is deeply 
broken. A refugee framework that was created and adopted to 
protect human beings from atrocities has been mangled and 
misapplied, leaving countless individuals abandoned in its wake. 
The current application of asylum law in the United States has 
strayed from the humanitarian aspirations of the Twentieth 
Century, opting instead to close the door and close its eyes on the 
suffering from which it once sought to offer shelter.  
A judicial or legislative framework that accepts gender as a 
basis for asylum claims is an essential step in ensuring that women 
suffering harm are able to seek the protection to which they are 
entitled. This, along with a stricter standard of review in appellate 
courts, a guarantee of legal representation, and independence of 
the immigration courts will provide the base needed to effectively 
 
arrives/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (describing reasons for the rise in decisions 
and denials) [perma.cc/H7CK-5SJ9]. 
 247.  See Birdsong, supra note 243, at 42 (“The next most cited suggestion for 
immigration is to transform the immigration courts into an Article I legislative 
court.”). 
 248.  See id. at 43 (“Although the judges on these courts lack life-time tenure, 
such courts provide a modicum of independence and transparency that is missing 
from the EOIR based immigration courts.”).  
 249.  See Elizabeth J. Stevens, Making Our Immigration Courts Courts, 65 
FED. LAW. 17, 17–18 (2018) (“[A]s we look to implement changes in our current 
immigration system, we must also aspire to lift the immigration courts from 
‘halfway there’ not-quite-courts to true Article I courts.”). 
 250.  See id. (stating that the Federal Bar Association’s position is that 
immigration courts should be Article I courts).  
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and properly decide women’s asylum claims. The proposals in this 
Note, however, are merely guideposts. A new understanding of the 
unique nature of gender persecution and its role in public and 
private spheres is the final step necessary to ensure that these 
claims are adjudicated accurately and equitably.  
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches all have the 
power to enact change necessary to begin applying immigration 
law correctly and consistently. No progress can be made without 
official action. The United States is commonly referred to as a 
nation of immigrants, but it has been countries such as Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia that have opened the door to 
asylum claims of women.251 It is time for the United States to glow 
a world-wide welcome to the tempest-tost masses, yearning to 
breathe free.252 
 
 251.  See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing how other countries 
created gender-based asylum claims).  
 252.  See EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883) (“From her beacon-hand 
glows a world-wide welcome . . . . Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I 
lift my lamp beside the golden door!”). 
